In â€œFamine, Affluence, and Morality,â€ Peter Singer makes a case for the universal application of a Judeo-Christian morality through his advocating of denying ones self for the sake of others. Ultimately, his claims hinge upon the nature of â€˜moral importanceâ€™, something so utterly arbitrary that it seems a foolish place to base such haughty conclusions.
Singerâ€™s argument is simple enough. He believes that any act that can be done without requiring a forfeiture of higher â€˜moral importanceâ€™ ought to be done. The ambiguity of that claim, along with the sliding scale that the human moral compass is constructed upon should give us pause. Whenever anyone says we ought to do something, we need to look closer at the choices and examine what we, by default, ought not to do. The choices in Bengal seemed quite clear to Singer. He says that India had only two choices, but history proved him wrong. His claims that this does not affect his overall thesis only serves to further a belief that the creation of moral ultimatums is easiest when one sees